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Abstract 
Globalisation and the rise of East Asia have accelerated the migration of Chinese populations across the Asia-
Pacific rim. Ethnic Chinese populations from highly diverse sub-ethnic, socio-economic and political 
backgrounds are increasingly aggregated in major cities throughout the region. Nonetheless, there remains 
insufficient attention to the implications of greater economic interdependence and accelerated population 
movement upon the political cultures of host nations such as Australia, especially in the context of ensuing 
spatial and economic concentrations of activity. 
 
Both articulate and interlocking relationships between political and economic fields exist in the metropolitan 
engagements of Chinese Australian community groups and associations. Many of these political dimensions 
extend into ‘formal’ modes of politics.   
 
Framed by urban regime theory and the broader notion of urban politics, this paper claims that network resource 
exchange within Chinese Australian communities are tied to ethnic economies, and in certain contexts global 
processes. These kinds of social dynamics have implications for the expression of diasporic Chinese affinity and 
constructions of Chineseness. Explorations of transnational political tensions, in fact, highlight the diversity and 
potential fragility of diasporic interdependence within ethnic Chinese communities – communities that are 
persistently refashioned through new waves of migration and from different points of origin. 
 
This paper seeks to advance these perspectives through a case study of a particular period of tension between 
two representative peak bodies in Brisbane, Queensland. Grounded in the testimony of elite political actors, it 
reflects upon the nature of ethnic Chinese community representation in contemporary Australia. 
 
 
Globalisation is at play through the increasing rapidity of movement of peoples across 
countries and the increasing presence of non-permanent political actors in the Australian 
labour market and polity. In recognising some of the implications of globalisation for 
economic systems, it becomes necessary to investigate how cities integrate and harness 
radically mobile formations of domestic and transnational capital, along with social agents 
who are heavily engaged in transnational economic flows. The relationship between global 
processes and ‘ethnic’ or ‘enclave’ economies can be understood through the evolving 
scholarship on Chinatowns. In particular, the development of concepts such as the 
‘ethnoburb’ (Li 1998, 2006) and the ‘ethnopolis’ (Laguerre 2000) have re-characterised 
ethnic enclaves as anchors for global processes and global cities as aggregations of 
transnational niches (Kwok 2008, 469). Re-characterisation of the enclave economy also 
implies the need to pay greater attention to the role of urban politics in providing processes of 
engagement between social agents embedded in these networks with those engaged in 
domestic political cultures (Stoker 1998, 126). 
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Such an approach recognises the complex interdependence between political and economic 
settings, and expresses an interest in Chinese involvement in Australian politics in a sense 
that is neither confined to ‘formal’ (Lam 2004) nor ‘conventional’ (Barnes, Kaase & 
Allerbeck 1979) forms of political participation. Instead of approaching ‘the political’ 
through an interest in electoral politics or the mobilisation of community groups and interests, 
this paper is focused at the interactions between social agents who operate through the 
apparatus of government. Our concern remains with the nature of Australian citizenship as 
experienced by social agents from minority perspectives, but turns to their differentiated 
experiences of the Australian political system. During an epoch of unprecedented global 
mobility, analysing Chinese Australian social agents and community organisations through 
such a lens repositions ethnicity-based community and civic formations as potentially class-
stratified through differentiated economic and transnational mobilities (Zhou & Lin 2005).  
 
The terrain of this discourse is a particular urban political approach called urban regime 
theory, what Clarence Stone defined as ‘the informal arrangements by which public bodies 
and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions’ (1989, p.229). It should be emphasised that the usefulness of urban regime theory 
arises here for very specific reasons. Certainly, it does not presume that network 
arrangements – which tie social agents from enclave economies and from political parties (or 
government) together – are regimes in the sense that they lead to comprehensive influence, or 
control of political decision-making. Urban regime theory is useful for other reasons (see 
Stoker 1998, Mossberger & Stoker 2001, p.813). The first reason is that an urban regime 
approach recognises the significance of informal networks rather than formal institutions; it 
thus looks to comprehend the structural bridges between public control of government and 
private control of economic resources. The second reason is that, while regime arrangements 
depend upon active collaboration, it assumes stable and durable relationships between urban 
elites and political actors (spanning successive governments) can be built, especially where 
they are tied together through global flows. The third reason is that urban regime theory 
denotes the significance of each particular metropolitan context. Implications for the relevant 
political culture by such arrangements become defined through network participants, and may 
be distinct in character depending upon the metropolitan location.  
 
More broadly, an urban regime approach theorises cultural formations with urban density in 
mind, acknowledging the city as the domain where the citizenship and identity claims of 
groups are recurrently, and in some instances, competitively articulated. In addition, the 
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spatial dimensions of interaction, between community or business leaders and formal political 
agents, recognises that much of the capacity in developing mechanisms of political access and 
transnational engagement requires support and endorsement by political decision-makers and 
authoritative bodies, at the state and local government level. Such an approach is guided by 
Saskia Sassen’s (1991, 2006) research on the competition between global cities as nodes of 
the global economy, in particular, her analysis in relation to the transforming role of 
government. This trend she captures through the phrase denationalisation – a phenomenon 
that has occurred deep inside the nation-state gearing political authority towards global 
economic engagement.  
 
These dynamics have important implications for citizenship and political inclusion from the 
vantage point of community politics and representation. It brings into stark relief the function 
of Chinese community leaders as cultural and political intermediaries; in particular, their 
capacity to distribute what Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) describe as politically-relevant social 
capital through their commitment to greater civic engagement. In this paper, I intend to 
explore the civic significance of urban politics through a case study that involves the 
competition for public legitimacy by two umbrella organisations in Brisbane, beginning near 
the end of 2005. The organisations involved were the Queensland Chinese Forum (QCF) and 
the Queensland Chinese Uniting Council (QCUC).1
 
 This case study, in addition, 
demonstrates the potential relevance and impact of sub-ethnic diversity in shaping competing 
transnational political orientations at the urban political level.  
Chinese Australian urban politics amidst Brisbane’s demographic heterogeneity 
Numerous metropolitan locations around the globe support highly heterogeneous diasporic 
Chinese populations. In Australia, the diversification in nations of origin for Chinese migrants 
is evident following the Colombo Plan (1949-57), the abandonment of the White Australia 
Policy (1973) and the rise of multicultural Australia (Ho & Kee 1988; Kee 1988; Ho & 
Coughlan 1997). In thinking about the political formations of Chinese Australian actors and 
communities, what requires further attention is what happens when diverse populations – 
each who claim, or are identified through, Chinese ethnicity – are brought or bound together.  
 
                                                          
1  Interview testimony in this paper has been extracted from a sample of 46 de-identified interviews collected between 
September 2005 and June 2007 for a doctoral thesis on the legislative recruitment and political incorporation of Chinese 
Australians. The interviews with QLD parliamentarians, political candidates, academics and community leaders occurred 
throughout this period of time. 
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Though there has been a continuous Chinese presence in Queensland since the 1840s, the 
modern demographic landscape begins after the introduction of Australian multiculturalism, 
in the late 1970s when the first waves of migration from Indochina and Vietnam reached 
Brisbane (Ip 2005, p.68). Following the birth of organisations in the late 1970s and early 
1980s – such as the Chinese Ethnic Broadcasting Association of Queensland, the Cathay 
Community Association (formerly the Cathay Club), and the Chinese-language newspaper 
Queensland Asian Business Weekly – there has been a significant expansion of community 
associations. There has been, for instance, a proliferation of Chinese-language newspapers; of 
organisational purposes extending from the Buddha’s Light International Association to 
Chinese Christian churches; as well as a diversification of sub-ethnic associations from the 
Taiwan Friendship Society to the Mainland Chinese Society of Queensland. Though the 
Queensland Multicultural Resource Directory remains a highly fraught document (not the 
least since its Chinese listings exclude Taiwanese associations), it contained no less than 70 
ethnic Chinese organisations in 2006-7 (MAQ 2009). 
 
Let us spend a moment comparing patterns of sub-ethnic Chinese diversity between the 
national context and Brisbane. The 2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census 
reintroduced a formulation of the ‘ancestry’ category in an attempt to better aggregate 
migrant populations based upon ethnicity rather than mere language competence.2
                                                          
2  ABS, 2006, 2914.0 - 2006 Census of Population and Housing - Fact Sheets, 
(http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/2914.0Main%20Features235002006?opendocument&tabname=
Summary&prodno=2914.0&issue=2006&num=&view=, Retrieved 10 November 2010) 
 It is not the 
purpose of this article to theorise about the robustness of the new category as a proxy for the 
inclusion of Australian-born Chinese. However, the category does enable us to analyse 
Australians who claim Chinese ancestry based upon country of origin. Chart 1, derived from 
the ABS census figures, indicates that in 2006 there were more Chinese Australians born in 
China than there were born in Australia. The chart accentuates that the largest sub-ethnic 
communities were the Mainland Chinese (30%), the Hong Kong and Malaysian Chinese 
(10%), followed by the Vietnamese Chinese (6%), the Singaporean, Indonesian and 
Taiwanese Chinese (4% each). 
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Data Source: 2006 ABS Census of Population and Housing 
 
Comparing the national distribution to Brisbane, Chart 2 suggests that though the Australian 
(21%), Hong Kong (11%), Malaysian (8%), Singaporean (4%), Vietnamese (5-6%), and 
Filipino (1%) populations were similar, there were significantly less Mainland Chinese (22% 
not 30%) and significantly more Taiwanese (17% not 4%) in Brisbane. There was also no 
notable Cambodian or Thai Chinese presence, though there was an identifiable Papua New 
Guinean Chinese community (3%).  
 
 
 
Data Source: 2006 ABS Census of Population and Housing 
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The academic literature recognises the concentration of Taiwanese migration to Brisbane with 
Queensland being the state most populated by Taiwan-born Chinese, a trend that has emerged 
since the mid 1990s (Ip, Wu & Inglis 1998; Ip 2001; Chiang & Hsu 2005). The concentration 
of Taiwanese Chinese in Brisbane is notable in terms of the potential impact upon 
transnational political issues, particularly the ‘cross-strait’ issue (Lien 2006). Cross-strait or 
Taiwan-strait tensions refer to the international uncertainty over Taiwan’s claims to 
independence from Mainland China and the prospects and conditions for Taiwan’s 
reunification.  
 
Though it has often been construed as a matter of national identity, the primacy of this issue 
in Taiwanese democratic politics is entrenched by Taiwan’s democratisation (Wu 2005), and 
the different stances of Taiwan’s two leading political parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT, Taiwan’s oldest political party, whose 
origins lie in the democratic philosophies of Dr Sun Yat-sen, has progressively transformed 
its position on Taiwanese independence. This has emerged through political events such as 
the ‘Pan-Blue’ or KMT delegation that visited Mainland China in 2005 (including the five-
point consensus signed on 29 April 2005 by both Hu Jintao and former KMT chairman Lien 
Chan on behalf of the KMT opposition), and more recently the Chen-Chiang Summits and the 
Cross-Straits Economic Trade and Culture Forum. In contrast, the DPP, whose establishment 
in 1986 followed Taiwan’s democratisation in the early 1980s, has maintained a long-
standing commitment to Taiwanese independence, a commitment that has been gradually 
nuanced according to the ‘special relationship’ between Taiwan and Mainland China, as 
much as its opposition to the One China Policy.  
 
Legitimation crisis: the QCF versus QCUC dispute 
Amidst Brisbane’s demographic landscape the Queensland Chinese Forum (QCF) has existed 
in various forms since 1984, but was only formally incorporated in 1995. Though some 
delegates claimed it operated merely as a liaison group between organisations, QCF has sat at 
the apex of a changeable consortium of community-based, largely non-profit associations, 
located mostly in metropolitan Brisbane. It is what is commonly referred to as a ‘peak’ or 
‘umbrella’ organisation, established to provide a space for community associations to engage 
with one another, and an entity to act on behalf of the Queensland Chinese community as a 
whole.  
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Thus the establishment of the Queensland Uniting Chinese Council (QCUC) in late 2005 was 
significant because it initiated what Jurgen Habermas (1975) once described as a 
‘legitimation crisis’ – a crisis over the capacity of QCF to coordinate dialogue and act on 
behalf of Queensland Chinese communities. In utilising Habermas’s phrase, it is understood 
that he looked at legitimation specifically in relation to state governance and theorised about 
the role of a cultural system of legitimation necessary to elicit mass loyalty from citizens. 
Nonetheless, the phrase maintains a more general meaning. It also represents a situation where 
a governing structure retains formal authority to govern, but is not able to demonstrate that its 
practical operation fulfils its intended end. It is meant in this sense here. The competition 
between these organisations for endorsement, by the Queensland state government and the 
Mainland Chinese consulate in Brisbane, represented a substantial fracture in the urban 
politics of Chinese communities in Queensland.   
 
In this dispute, allegations were made that QCF had provided inadequate community 
leadership. According to some this was for more than a decade. Its alleged precarious 
reputation was apparent in its incapacity to manage sub-ethnic political tensions; in particular, 
its alleged failure to accommodate greater Mainland Chinese integration into its membership 
structure. M, a QCF delegate intimated: 
 
I’m also aware of now, through QCF, there’s official difference (of) opinion 
between the Taiwanese group and the pro-China group.  And I think we’re at the 
moment (in) a bit of a stew because the Mainland China group wants to join QCF 
and so the current Taiwanese ones want to back off. 
 
G suggested that the cross-strait issue had been an important source of political fragmentation 
amongst Chinese associations in Queensland, ‘Even now there’s already a split, in regards to 
Taiwan, Chinese, and Mainland Chinese.  There’s already a split there’. H agreed, ‘I mean, 
you can see a lot of activity will be totally organised and involved by one community and it’s 
the other community will not be involved in it. And this is one thing which QCF is going to 
overcome’. Some attributed this fracture to an aggressive pro-independence stance held by 
certain groups within the Taiwanese community. G suggested, ‘You know, we got some 
right-wing Chinese from Taiwan that is influencing others. Just one of those sad things to see 
happen. But what can we do?  Except to try to pacify them, and try and work together with 
them as best as we could.’ Others attributed it to competition amongst political party 
intermediaries for the support of sub-ethnic factions.  
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QCF’s domestic focus notably constrained its capacity to manage cross-strait tensions, with 
key QCF delegates emphasising that member organisations needed to set their transnational 
politics aside. H confirmed that QCF’s focus upon domestic issues meant that it refused to 
take sides in the cross-strait issue:  
Being the Chinese community (it) is inevitable that some of our people in 
Queensland are also active in terms of the political activity between Mainland 
China and Taiwan… This has been debated and discussed in QCF many, many 
times.  And we make it quite clear that QCF are not, or will not, be involved in 
the political activity between Mainland China and Taiwan.  
 
Others such as E emphasised a role for a peak body in managing the potential scope of this 
conflict:  
 
‘Eventually some issue will divide the Chinese community up into parts, like if 
there was someone stupid enough to push a button across the Chinese strait. 
That will immediately divide the Chinese community within an hour… within 
an hour of that happen segregation instated (sic). How do we manage that as a 
community?’  
 
In contrast, counter-allegations claimed that QCUC’s aims were almost exactly the same as 
QCF, and that it was initiated by a small group of community leaders with the intention of 
competing and eventually replacing the existing peak body. The prominent if not dominant 
role of Mainland Chinese migrants in the QCUC also raised questions about the 
organisation’s capacity to host dialogue on cross-strait matters.  
 
Comparison of the organisational aims strongly suggests that QCUC was started with the 
intention of competing for the peak representative role (QCF 2006; QCUC 2005). Some 
explicit differences are evident in organisational structure.  The constituting documents 
confirm that QCF membership depended upon delegates from member associations. Where 
QCF’s organisational structure primarily supports and enhances the capacity of associational 
leaders, QCUC could be considered more structurally inclusive as it also supports individual 
membership. The wording and priority of the two aims and objectives also highlight some 
divergence in organisational priorities.  Where QCF’s first political commitment is to the 
interests of ethnic Chinese organisations on domestic matters, QCUC’s is more explicitly 
guided by the principles of better intra-organisational communication and the advancement of 
Chinese culture. Former president, Dr Su Mingxian, also publicly argued that QCF had not 
been adequate in developing Chinese diasporic political strength – defining a major purpose 
for the new QCUC as lifting the engagement of young people in the political process and 
increasing the number of Chinese Australians involved in Australian politics.  
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Reflecting upon the significance of cross-strait tensions in Brisbane, it is important to 
recognise how poorly the symbolic ties of Chineseness constitute space for political 
solidarity. This is not only a dynamic problematised by the interactions between Chinese and 
host populations, but a reflection of the diversity of political attitudes based upon Chinese 
migration patterns themselves. The transnational dimensions of the cross-strait issue in 
Brisbane might be described as a kind of ‘expanded transnationalism’ (Vertovec 2009, p.18), 
resounding in political effects not only between Taiwanese Chinese and Mainland Chinese 
migrants, but with diffuse and uneven implications for enclave networks and the ‘interlocking 
leadership’ structures that Flemming Christiansen (2003) described as emerging out of the 
associational system (119). 
 
Organisational competition based upon political access 
The case study is significant because the focus upon political capacity-building by QCUC 
meant that political engagement became a key area regarding the legitimation of QCF’s peak 
status. QCUC had successfully invited ethnic Chinese political representatives, such as state 
ALP member for Capalaba, Michael Choi, and Federal Liberal member for Ryan, Michael 
Johnson, to QCUC as honorary patrons. This delivered the organisation important symbolic 
legitimacy and put into context the 2007 conference hosted by the QCF, called Australian 
Chinese, Australian Politics. This conference, held at State Parliament, effectively reinforced 
QCF’s peak body legitimacy by providing a platform for not only Choi and Johnson but 
Coalition leader, Dr Bruce Flegg, and ALP campaign manager, Milton Dick, to address 
community members.  
 
Also significant was the Chinese New Year function held earlier in 2007 by Premier Peter 
Beattie at Parliament House, an event which symbolically backed the QCF and its honorary 
president, Peter Low. H, in establishing the political credentials of QCF, looked to Premier 
Peter Beattie’s annual Chinese New Year function as a key example; 
 
I’m not sure if we are the most politically active, but we are seen as very 
politically active. For example, QCF successfully lobbied the Premier for the 
last three or four years. He has been hosting a Chinese New Year function for 
the last three or four years in Parliament. Every Chinese New Year for the last 
three or four years he hosts a big function, inviting all the – I wouldn’t say all – 
over two hundred from the Chinese community to go to state parliament to 
celebrate Chinese New Year. 
 
Since that time, the vociferousness of the dispute has diminished with the two peak 
organisations collaborating through activities such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, fundraising 
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for the Sichuan Earthquake and Queensland Flood Appeals. Nonetheless, the tensions which 
produced the dispute impart an important window into the competition for political access by 
elite community leaders, organisations and enclave networks.  
 
The dispute between QCF and QCUC goes to the heart of the potential impact of 
transnational formations upon both the urban politics of globally-dispersed Chinese 
communities and domestic politics, in a more formal context. Through the transformation of 
political institutions, government and consulate representatives assume an important symbolic 
position as the imprimatur of formal institutions, and as its symbolic gate-keepers. In turn, the 
instrumental function of these leadership structures establishes routines for more concerted 
exchange and flow. Beyond the explicit role political actors may play in directly influencing 
the ecology of major cities, particularly in terms of property development, the kinds of 
activities and networks that strengthen business engagement, particularly through political 
access, define an important contested privilege – political access in itself represents a locus of 
contested urban political power.  
 
This emerged as a much debated aspect of the conflict between the peak status of QCF and 
QCUC. Speculation arose that part of QCUC’s rationale for advancing the political 
prominence of a ‘united’ Chinese community was its interest in transforming or leveraging 
the business and trade relationship between Australia and China. In January 2006, Dr Su 
argued; ‘In comparison with percentage of Chinese people in Queensland population and 
Chinese economic strength in the state, such a situation is not satisfactory.’ D, a Mainland 
Chinese leader, privately asserted that business relations had not been a sufficient focus for 
QCF: 
A lot of people know us. Even people in China know us. Consul people, 
embassy, know us, government know us, so they all want us to be part of them.  
But when I go to their (QCF) meeting I can see the job that they did – totally 
different. Totally different! QCF mainly focus on – let the Chinese community 
involve in Australian system (sic).   
 
Consider also that at least seven of twelve delegates of QCF were, at the time, members of the 
Queensland China Council (QCC), a consultative body convened by the Queensland state 
government to facilitate trade through the promotion of political and cultural goodwill. The 
capacity of the body was based upon the late former Deputy Premier Tom Burns’ special 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politburo; a special relationship that 
stemmed from his involvement in the original and historic delegation of ALP members to 
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Mainland China in 1971. Its activities have included routine delegations from China to 
Queensland, Queensland to China, and their mandate covers economic, educational and 
cultural network building. The overlap between the two is indicative of the bond between 
QCF leadership networks and representatives of the ALP government in Queensland, a 
relationship reinforced by trade and business opportunities.  
 
Part of QCUC’s rationale for advancing the political prominence of a ‘united’ Chinese 
community was its interest in gaining greater political access to these kinds of relationships 
and networks. Competition was underpinned by the distribution of substantive network 
resources through modes of political access, most of these having explicit economic and trade 
orientations. QCUC’s public statements around the significance of the Chinese community’s 
engagement in government-to-government trade networks failed to acknowledge that 
transformation of informal networks of access into modes of political influence are 
inconsistent with mainstream democratic values. In contrast, delegates of QCF made links 
between political access and influence, but overwhelmingly recognised the informal nature of 
this influence. Importantly, however, political access for some members of the QCF 
leadership was also a basis to promote personal, commercial, and in a few instances, political 
interests.   
 
Implications for Chinese Australian urban politics 
Chinatowns have persistently been sites for groups and political movements to push the 
barrow of political ideology. From political allegiances around the Hung League and Chinese 
Masonic Societies, which proliferated at the end of the 19th century, to the Nationalist and 
Kuomintang movements of the 1920s and later, the transnational reach of Chinese political 
engagements is uncontroversial. Numerous scholars have enhanced historical insight into the 
texture of these political formations in Australia. For instance, Tian Ming Cai (1998) explored 
this through the Chun Wah association’s unification of district and clan alliances, to oppose 
the effects of racism under the White Australia Policy. Likewise, John Fitzgerald (2006) more 
recently considered the role of Chinese Australians in shaping organisational orientations 
imbued with the character of Australian class politics. There is perhaps no more precise way 
to dispel the presumption that Chinese Australians are intrinsically less political compared to 
other migrant communities or populations. 
 
Based upon the Brisbane case study, two crucial claims about the character of Chinese 
Australian urban politics emerge. The first stems from an expansion in the number of 
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community organisations, as well as an expansion in their adaptive functions. The broadening 
array of organisational purposes has been triggered by major transformations in diasporic 
Chinese communities themselves (and the spaces that Chinese migratory populations inhabit). 
As Edgar Wickberg claimed, since World War II families have replaced sojourning males; 
Chinese immigrants have brought an increasing diversity of skills, resources and status; and 
migration is sourced from a growing multitude of nations and sub-ethnic backgrounds (1994, 
p.76). We might add to this observation, the lived dimensions of cultural ‘hybridisation’, 
which empower a greater range of social agents to cross group boundaries, and also implicitly 
creates the political space for boundary maintenance by various social agents.  
 
This growing demographic heterogeneity poses important questions to community groups and 
(in particular) peak or umbrella organisations, in terms of their capacity to mobilise and 
represent communities. In relation to Chinese Australian urban politics, the ‘contact zones’ of 
global cities (Yeoh & Willis 2005) produce complex, fluctuating networks of interlocking 
ethnic leadership in which group identities become sites for contested meaning. These are 
dependent not only upon racial marginalisation, migratory flows, but formations of domestic 
and transnational economic capability. We should also consider that, in some instances, there 
may be sufficient social stratification to establish diverse rights claims. This can relate to a 
community’s symbolic resources as much as it can to identity or geographic space. As Tseen 
Khoo recognised in the cultural competition for urban space in Brisbane, ‘Chinatowns have 
multiple, contested meanings for different sectors of the community, and no single function 
eclipses others’ (2009, p.215). This does not deny the fundamental need for representative 
groups (especially representative groups that have political functions), but begs a question 
about the basis upon which legitimation of an organisation is centred. It is necessary to 
consider the kind of social resources an organisation deploys to justify the representation of a 
community or a group’s interests.  
 
Secondly, the competition for political access and the outpouring of urban political conflict in 
this case study, highlights the tenacity of those specific network arrangements in bridging 
public and private spheres. We may consider the effects of globalisation upon the way we 
understand the Australian political system and the apparatus of government as actors in the 
global economic order. Chinese migrations have impacted upon the economic capability of 
major cities through the migration of transnational economic actors, the development of 
enclave economies, as well as a reorientation by major cities to the global dimensions of 
economic activity. These patterns create opportunities for new governance mechanisms and 
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increasingly complex approaches to urban politics as the governing bodies of these cities 
adapt.  
 
While this paper does not posit (as part of its approach to urban regime theory) an emptying 
out of governance functions, it does seek to reinforce the relevance of globalisation in the 
development of urban regime arrangements incorporating Chinese Australian community 
actors and organisations. According to Stone (2005, p.331), urban regime theory ultimately 
looks to understand how viable and durable arrangements for engagement and governance are 
created and claims the development of a regime is based upon at least the following three 
conditions:  
• an agenda,  
• resource adequacy, and  
• an alignment of actors.  
The conditions for the durability of a regime are further enhanced by ‘selective incentives’, 
which directly benefit network participants along the way (2005, p.320). Though Stone 
constructs urban regimes as largely ‘contingent’ (2005, p.325), he also recognises that 
regimes are ‘structural’ in the sense that they are compelled by structural forces such as those 
generated through global processes. Thus, in coming to terms with the global orientation of 
enclave economies, we can understand the recurrent potential for regime arrangements to 
emerge. 
 
The significance of this for governmental and political agents – who are increasingly attuned 
to the role of ethnically-based enclave economies as anchors for global processes – implies 
increasing interest in modes of resource exchange that have little to do with the transfer of 
information or the intermediation capacity of non-elite immigrant organisations (Poppelaars 
2007, p.20). The influence of the global economy emerges in creating the conditions for 
network arrangements that sustain durable and recurrent means of interaction, between public 
and private social agents vested in the economic development of enclave economies, and 
networks tied to international business and trade. In addition, social agents engaged in these 
kinds of network and regime arrangements, be they politicians, business or community 
leaders, may act or be coopted, as agents or interested parties, in building trade, business or 
government-to-government ties. These ‘opportunities’ are likely to sustain themselves, 
whether or not trends in migration and multicultural scholarship are interested in political 
participation and civic engagement.  
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Conclusion 
The urban regime arrangements considered in this paper provide both opportunities and risks 
for the nature of Chinese Australian community representation. Engin Isin in Democracy, 
Citizenship and the Global City (2000) argued that the citizenship status of the foreigner - 
swept up in the logics of global capital - is expressed in terms of a political struggle for 
presence. Isin implied that the new dimension of political struggle is not in defence of the 
traditional rights of property, but the right to claim presence, the right to access resources. 
This is a phenomenon brought about by an unbundling of citizenship rights in global cities 
constituted by political actors who have different investments in citizenship. While these 
ideas construct a moral landscape for the expansion of democratic participation, they also 
establish an apparatus supporting transnational economic flows and mobilities. And thus a 
durable urban regime can equally operate to entrench social inequality by excluding ‘lower-
status’ groups (Stone 2005, p.328). The nature of fluctuating community leadership networks 
tie representation and political engagement to informal modes of political access based in 
enclave networks and economies. In this process, community elites compete not only for the 
right to represent, but the right to be present, greased by the networks that politicians and 
political parties often cultivate for fundraising, vote-catching and influencing constituents.  
 
In exploring how regimes are established, Stone (2005) reconsidered the significance of 
agenda-setting as a structure for the agency of participants, and the need to comprehend the 
durability of a regime based upon its capacity to draw together the resources necessary to 
fulfil or implement such an agenda. This area is perhaps one of the great challenges for local 
and state governments, as well as political leaders in their engagement with urban politics. 
The agenda for the establishment of network arrangements between public and private ethnic 
business interests have often been framed by a symbolic commitment to a version of 
multiculturalism that has suffered from long-standing and broadly-accepted conceptual flaws. 
One has been its institutionalisation of difference and its reification of cultural expression, 
which has diminished the relevance of building democratic cultures through greater civic 
engagement, and in particular, the potential to utilise community resources to bridge gaps in 
the distribution of politically-relevant social capital. The second is that newer and 
supplementary concepts, such as ‘productive diversity’ (Bertone, Esposto & Turner 1998), 
have in some instances allowed the economic and political dimensions of network 
engagement to be conflated. In numerous instances, such as in Brisbane, Queensland, this has 
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bifurcated government priorities in relation to multicultural engagement towards more 
entrenched and more prosperous communities.  
 
The final challenge is that settings within public discourse are a major constraint to exploring 
Australian citizenship in the context of globalisation. In spite of emergent discourses on post-
national citizenship, our political identities remain tied to geography – we each remain 
citizens of somewhere. The citizen is a juridical, cultural and political status, a social position 
reflecting distribution of power and resources vested by the nation-state, but also a social 
boundary between us-and-them, arising because of migration or fortune of birth, managed by 
instruments of the state that range from constitutional protections through the enforcement of 
human rights covenants and trade agreements to the historical antecedents of national 
cultures. Pervasively human bodies are arbitrated between the inclusion and exclusion of a 
range of legal protections, in effect the rights and obligations secured by the formal 
boundaries of citizenship (Linklater 1998). Therefore, social inequalities can in fact be 
ingrained where social policies governing cultural difference fail to allocate proper 
recognition of the role of global processes in transforming urban and metropolitan landscapes. 
Certainly the international education market sits at this conceptual precipice. Current 
iterations of Australian citizenship, multiculturalism and social inclusion remain locked into 
modes of interpretation that are territorially-bound, at a time when they need to reorient to the 
effects of globalisation. The starting point would be deeper, smarter engagement through 
public discourse and political leadership about how Australia’s future is tied to national myths 
and concepts at ease with cultural diversity, and leadership willing to commit to a notion of 
citizenship that actively seeks more diverse civic and political inclusion.  
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